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Abstract
The Internet is a necessity for people around the world including Asia. It is a means to connect
politicians, political party supporters, activists, and the parties themselves. The advent of
Internet cafes and email has greatly enabled the integration of global communication. At the
same time, the emerging cyber culture of the Internet challenges the very notions of sovereignty,
government, political parties, civil society, and conventional politics in China, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, and throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The political context of Internet usage
differs throughout the Asia-Pacific region, but certain concerns are common to the role the
Internet plays in the region. Will the Internet create a political culture that undermines
conventional politics? And will Internet usage in Asia result in the creating of local cultural
content, strengthen regional diversity and enhance political maturity? To answer the questions,
the paper will present some cases of the Internet’s impact to politics in China, Indonesia,
Japan, and South Korea. Then, the paper will describe some of the similarities between the
cases. Finally it will conclude with some conceptual ideas as to what Indonesia can learn
about Internet-based politics from these cases.
Introduction
The Internet is a necessity for people around
the world including Asia. It is a means to
connect politicians, political party supporters,
activists, and the parties themselves.
Schroeder (2004) has said:
The Internet has changed the way people
communicate and now is in the process of
changing political and advertising campaigns.
A Stanford University study found that the
more years people have been using Internet,
the more they spend hours on the Internet, and
political communication expert are starting to
grasp it” (pp. 28-29).
Additionally, the Internet is a pubic space
where people go to read and express their
political opinions. The number of political
website and blogs grow daily. Google.com
search results return more than 189.000 for
humorous political website and 310.000 for
political website (Ragusa, 2004)
The Internet is becoming the dominant
and preferred method of communication in
Asia. This poses new and unforeseen threats
and opportunities throughout the Asia -Pacific
region. The advent of Internet cafes and email
has greatly enabled the integration of global
communication. At the same time, the
emerging cyber culture of the Internet
challenges the very notions of sovereignty,
government, political parties, civil society,
and conventional politics in China, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, and throughout the Asia-Pacific
region.
There is extensive discourse in Asia
about the role of the Internet, who should and
can control it, and its cultural, political and
economic impact. In China, the government
seeks to control the Internet and related e-mail
services to prevent public access to sensitive
cultural and political information in order to
prevent civil society from developing
challenges to the one party state. In Indonesia,
the Internet cafes are fast replacing the
convention of discussing politics and reading
aloud from newspapers in urban coffee shops.
In Japan, a much more politically open
society, the government and its political party
have their own definition for allowable usage
of the Internet. In South Korea, the Internet
could and did have an impact on politics.  The
political context of Internet usage differs
throughout the Asia-Pacific region, but certain
concerns are common to the role the Internet
plays in the region. Will the Internet create a
political culture that undermines conventional
politics? And will Internet usage in Asia result
in the creating of local cultural content,
strengthen regional diversity and enhance
political maturity?
To answer the questions above, I will
present some cases of the Internet’s impact to
politics in China, Indonesia, Japan, and South
Korea. Then, I will describe some of the
similarities between the cases. Finally I will
conclude my paper with some conceptual
ideas as to what Indonesia can learn about
Internet-based politics from these cases.
Censorship and Propaganda in China
China established Internet access
officially in 1994. There were only 10,000
Internet users at that time (Yang, 2003). Since
then, Internet access has expanded
considerably in China over the past years.
According to official statistics, the number of
Internet users rose to 79.5 million by
December 2003 from 59.1 million users in
December 2002 (“Behind,” 2004). China
Today showed that there were 87 million of
Internet users in early December 2004, the
second largest number in the world (Epstein,
2004).
This number has presented the
authorities with greater challenges in their
attempts to censor and control the online
activities of Internet users. The Chinese
Government through The Chinese
Communist Party employs a number of
approaches to control the Internet, from
introducing numerous regulations to
encouraging self-censorship, with some
success (Shie, 2004). A report in June 2001
from Chinaonline.com said that “Internet
regulations come from Beijing, but each
province has a significant amount of control,
and authorities in each city also have some
local autonomy. Consequently, in different
places, there is great variation in policies,
regulations, services, and prices” (China
Online, 2001). Over the past year, there has
been a growing trend towards assigning
greater responsibilities of surveillance and
monitoring to a variety of Internet companies
in China such as Internet Cafes, Information
Service Providers (ISPs) and other enterprises.
The government has built what is known as
“The Great Firewall of China” with the help
of foreign company, Cisco system, a United
States-based company. Cisco designed a
router device, integrator, and firewall box
specifically tailored to the People’s of
Republic China’s telecommunication system
to block viruses and hackers on a national
scale (Gutmann, 2002).
In China, the Internet is state-owned
and operated. The Internet is believed to serve
as a political vehicle for the Chinese
government. In 1999 the Chinese Communist
Party launched a “government online project
(zhengfushangwang) that aimed that by the
end of 2000, 80 percent of its departments
had to be online (Zhang, 2001). By now, most
of the departments are online with sites that
are sponsored by Microsoft, IBM and Legend
(de Kloet, 2002). As Jiang Zemin, former head
of the Chinese Communist Party, said that
“the speed and scope of (information flows)
have created a borderless information space
around the world…the melding of the
traditional economy and information
technology will provide the engine for the
development of the economy and society in
21st century” (Kalathil, 2003). The
government then improved many civil
services which formerly would have been very
time-consuming or near impossible for many
citizen to access via Internet. It is expected
that all of the PRC’s central authorities,
provinces, municipalities, autonomous
regions, and embassies in foreign countries
will be connected to the Internet and offer
websites by 2010 (Shie, 2004).
With the introduction of “Government
Online,” the Party hopes to lessen the tension
between the populace and the authorities by
allowing cybercitizens (in a limited form) to
air their grievances (Zhang, 2001). The
government also has provided some
possibilities for channeling opinions
expressed by Chinese users in the Internet.
The installation of a discussion forum on the
homepage of the People’s Daily can not be
interpreted merely as an effort to monitor
public opinion, rather also as an attempt to
allow public opinion to be conveyed in a mild
form. For some intellectuals certain gestures,
like that of the State Development Planning
Commission seeking suggestions on state
development plans from its “Online Forum,”
are encouraging (Zhang, 2001). Another
improvement is the introduction of a mailbox
for different municipal governments with
cybercitizens, as well as polls in various
official websites seeking to collect the
opinions and suggestions of Internet users.
Notions such as increased transparency and
democracy may merely serve as ideological
veils; the pro-active role of the Chinese
nation-state when it comes to the Internet
might be considered as yet another
performative attempt to legitimize its power
(Zhang, 2001). Most interesting here is the
belief in and importance attached to the
Internet that is reflected in such a policy, a
belief that also comes back in the following
statement of an official: “We in the
government think we missed a lot of the
industrial revolution. And we don’t want to
miss the digital revolution!” (Hachigian,
2001). This means that technology links up
with the project of the nation-state, but now
the railways and assembly lines are replaced
by bits and bytes (de Kloet, 2002). In addition,
Yang (2003) has said that the Internet has
become part of an important new era in
China’s civil society development. In a recent
Internet survey, 42 percent of respondents said
that they see the Internet as an aid to China’s
political democratization process (China
Today, 2004). All levels of government uses
the Internet to facilitate transparency; it allows
public supervision of governmental projects,
registration of cases, trials and executions.
Alongside its e-government program,
the Chinese government is strengthening its
uses of the Internet to distribute propaganda
and engage in thought work. These practices,
long crucial to the effective functioning of
China’s communist regime, have been
adapted to the information age, primarily
through the use of web sites that present a
new and often more subtle rendering of the
government’s perspective (Kalathil & Boas,
2003). The government has set up specific
web sites to publish its perspective on current
events. This is especially relevant when the
government claims that “misinformation” is
being disseminated by opposing groups, as
in the case of the Falun Gong. Various reports
in English and Chinese feature give
testimonials from “reeducated” Falun Gong
practitioners, photographs of self-immolating
protestors in Tiananmen Square. More subtly
the People’s Daily maintain a strong web
presence that is significantly livelier that its
stodgy print counterpart. It offers an
increasing mix of sports and lifestyle news,
coupled with a popular, nationalistically
themed chat room that competes with those
run by private companies (Kalathil & Boas,
2003). The online English version of the
People’s Daily, designed to present a modern
face to the rest of world, features news as well
as links to government white papers, the
selected works of Deng Xiaoping, and the
Chinese constitution. All these measures fit
neatly into the government’s plan to build a
large coordinated online propaganda system.
The State Council Information Office has
established an Internet Propaganda
Administrative Bureau, responsible for
“guiding and coordinating” web news content,
while chief Ding Guangen has directed major
state media organs to use the Internet fully
(Kalathil & Boas, 2003).
In addition to distributing propaganda
on the Internet global, the government is
reviving the idea of a national intranet, which
is intended to substitute for the global Internet
by providing online services paired with
acceptable content (whose exact nature has
yet to be detailed) for the Chinese citizen
(Zhang, 2001). Called CNet, the planned
intranet is characterized as a proprietary
communication and data network that will
feature better security and “homegrown
technology.” Although such ideas have been
discussed and deferred for a number of years,
their perpetual revival as a national priority
demonstrates the state’s continued
determination to address the infiltration of
foreign ideas (Zhang, 2001).
In general, Internet use in the political
sphere has proved to be a net benefit for the
Chinese government. Increasingly
sophisticated e-government measures are
geared toward service provision, which helps
to increase citizen satisfaction with the
government and perhaps to provide a form of
legitimacy that somewhat, replaces the
representative process. Reform-minded
officials are pushing the use of the
Government Online project as a tool to flatten
and streamline China’s government structure,
as well as to reform governance itself.
Propaganda organs are benefiting from
Internet use, helping the government to reach
a new, younger audience (Kalathil & Boas,
2003).
Underground and Civil Society in
Indonesia
Indonesia became connected to the
global Internet in 1994, as a result of
pioneering efforts by the academic and
research community (ITU, 2002). By the end
of 1995, there were 16 ISPs, 20,000 users and
640 Kbps of international internet
connectivity. For the year ending 2000 there
were an estimated 400,000 Internet dial-up
subscribers translating to roughly two million
users, or just under one percent of the
population (Creed, 2001). Official APJII
(Indonesia Internet Service Provider
Association)’s estimate of the number of
subscribers and internet users by the end of
year 2005 is 1,500,000 subscribers with
around 16 million of users (APJII, 2005).
The Internet which came to Indonesia during
the early phase of the political crisis in the
1990s emerged as an alternative form of
media that is no longer under state control
(Lim, 2003). According to Lim (2003), the
Internet came in contact with the concept of
“society” that in turn used and transformed
this technology in unique ways. The Internet
has accordingly been developing in Indonesia
with its own unique practices and
characteristics, transformed by localized
power structures related to the three spheres
in society, namely, the state, the corporate
economy, and civil society.
Before the collapse of Suharto’s New Order
government, the state was a very dominant
actor that owned all public services in order
to keep capital in its orbit, including Telecom
and Indosat, both telecommunication
companies. These companies had the licenses
for supplying Internet access. After changes
of government, in 2004, the government
through the companies it owned still tried to
maintain a near monopoly hold over the
Internet access and its attendant commerce.
Telecom is still owned by the government
while Indosat underwent privatization with 42
percent of the shares held by ST Telemedia
Singapore and 58 percents held by the
Indonesian government (Laksamana, 2004).
Telecom is the only a dominant player in non-
dial-up-service for the Internet and Indosat is
the only company that provides the
international connection making it the portal
for reaching the global Internet (Lim, 2003).
This means that all Internet service providers
need Indosat to connect to the Internet global.
In addition, the government also regulates the
monopolies of the telecommunication
industry (Lim, 2003).
In this point the Internet is still
believed to serve as a political vehicle for the
Indonesian government (de Kloet, 2002).
Although the government does not block
Internet sites, it gains economic benefit from
the users and Internet service providers
through increasing the cost of Internet access
by increasing local telephone fees. The
government increase local telephone fees by
28.21 percent in March 2004. The Internet
access fee for the Internet service providers
is US $1.07 in addition to an access fee and
10 percent tax (US $1 = 9, 265 IDR). It
directly depresses the market for local Internet
service providers because they cannot
compete with Telecom service providers
(Tempo, 2004). The users can access the
Internet from TelkomNet Instan provided by
Telecom via telephone line at the same price
but without having to pay access fees and tax.
The additional cost for obtaining Internet
access helps to maintain the government’s
power (Lim, 2003). At the same time the
government does not allow foreign Internet
service providers to operate in Indonesia
(Chip-Online, 2005).
However, the civil society is not so easily
manipulated with these rules of usage and
Internet access fees. Civil society is still aware
of its rights and sees that the Internet makes
global–local direct contact possible, thus
making information available from abroad
that was previously not accessible in
Indonesia. This has undermined not only the
ability but also the legitimacy of the state to
control access to information. When citizens
are made aware through the Internet of all
sorts of alternative sources of information
other wise not available no danger to their
well-being, the idea of allowing the state to
control the Internet is rejected, either overtly
by public acts of resistance or covertly through
underground information networks using the
Internet with expensive access fee.
The famous mailing list, Apakabar,
was a perfect example. Started by an
American, John McDougall, Apakabar
forwarded Indonesian-related news articles to
its subscribers all over the world. Most of the
information it obtained was not available
within Indonesia because it was controversial
and critical of the Indonesian New Order
regime. As it developed, it became one of the
main sources for uncensored news and
discussion on Indonesia (Lim, 2003). In 1996–
1998, this list became a major irritant for the
army and the Department of Information, and
helped to establish the Internet’s reputation
as a radically free medium (Hill and Sen,
1997).
To provide low-cost or affordable
Internet access for society, Purbo and
Computer Network Research Group (CNRG)
created and labeled their movement as a
“guerilla movement”. By utilizing Japanese
satellite, Purbo and CNRG connected with a
global actor (Japan Corporation Satellite and
WIDE Japan) which had a global project (the
Asian Internet Initiative Project) to create a
mass base for the Internet (Lim, 2003). It
provided opportunities for civil society to
circumvent media access rules imposed by the
government.
The rise of civil society supported by
the Internet successfully overthrew Suharto.
The efforts of civil society did not end with
the demise of Suharto’s regime; they
continued and re-emerged through the
everyday practices of civil society in the post-
Suharto era. It keeps struggling to gain the
power to create alternative spaces for identity
and civic life outside of, and often against,
the agenda of the state and of business (Hill
& Sen, 2002).
In 1997 elections had provided the
three legal parties with an opportunity to test
the campaign value of having an Internet site.
The move was led by the Muslim-oriented
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,
Development Unity Party) which launched its
site, www.ppp.or.id on the 25th of April 1997,
declaring in its ‘editorial’ that it aimed to
provide a means of rapid, economical party
communication to disseminate information
about activities and party views, in a manner
not possible via its monthly print publication
which circulated mainly to party
functionaries. By May both Golkar
(www.golkar.co.id  and www.indocon.com/
golkar) as a ruling government’s party and the
PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian
Democracy Party) (www.banteng.org) as
minority party had followed suit. The Internet
was seen by some commentators as offering
the PPP and the PDI (which did not even have
a regular print periodical) a means of
campaign communication which was not
regulated by the government, unlike radio,
television and print media for which the
minister of information had set a campaign
protocol (Hill, 2003).
Two years later the political tableau
was more complex. Only a minority of the
forty-eight parties contesting the 1999
elections had their own web sites; most were
not interactive, providing mainly static
information. The National Mandate Party
(PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional), with its
strong appeal to middle-class university-
educated voters, was quick to launch its web
site (www.amanat.org) in August 1998, barely
one day after its formal establishment,
featuring a photograph of founder Amien
Rais, and bilingual (English and Indonesian)
sub-pages. By March 1999 as the campaign
heated up, the party claimed around 3,000
visitors per day, but the slow and broken
transmission, and a string of programming
glitches proved a turn-off for netters
(Pareanom et al.1999). It was a common
problem for party web sites. The web site of
the transformed PDI, now known as PDI-
Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democracy
Party of Struggle)
(www.megawati.forpresident.com), was
described as attractive, but rather slow to
access because of an excess of content. As
journalists from Tempo magazine discovered,
this was still better than the PKB [National
Awakening Party, Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa] site (www.pkb.org) which for the
previous few days had been stalled
(Pareanom, Yusi, Setiawan, & Arjanto, 1999).
However the Internet was used by Jakarta
politicians, at least anecdotally, to monitor the
coverage given to them by both the Indonesian
and international media (Hill, 2003) To some
extent the battle for political attention was an
international one, with figures like
presidential aspirant Amien Rais keen to
follow the nuance of such media attention,
and the web providing a rapid method for this
(Hill, 2003).
In 2004, when Indonesia had a direct
presidential election for the first time; the
Internet also becomes part of the campaigning
process to build positive images of the
presidential candidates. Haque (2005) said
that the two of five president candidates who
passed to the second round developed their
own websites to attract potential voters. The
elected president, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, successfully used his campaign
websites to crystallize of his positive image
among Internet users. This is because 40% of
Indonesian population is young people and
educated people (Haque, 2005). Most of them
wanted to see change in Indonesia. Although
the number of Indonesian Internet users was
only 8% of the total population the Internet
became a tool that played a decisive role in
affecting Indonesian public opinion (Haque,
2005).
All of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s
sites were developed by Bloracenter.net, at
which the presidential candidate and his
followers gathered, edited, created, and
published relevant information. After he
became president, Bloracenter.net became an
information center for him to meet with his
supporters and voters by direct meeting or
teleconference. On February 25, 2005,
Bloracenter.net, the official website of the new
president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
announced that the site would be providing
internal information about the activities of his
government cabinets in “Tabloid Kabinet –
Cabinet Tabloid”. This e-journal would
provide positive or negative critiques to
members of his government cabinets.
According to the site, the tabloid aims to
develop the quality of work of any the
ministries to increase accountability to the
public (Bloracenter, 2005).
Regulation and Political Party Competition
in Japan
At first time, In Japan, the use of the
Internet was a bottom-up process, initiated by
a small group of academics with virtually no
government support, and spreading in a
largely unplanned and spontaneous way.
Japan has lagged behind the US and other
industrialized countries in adopting the
Internet (Rimmer and Morris-Suzuki, 1999).
However, Japan has been catching up in
developing the Internet presence. The growth
of Internet usage in Japan has accelerated
since the early 1990s. In July 1993, Japan
established the first Internet Service Provider-
Internet Initiative Japan (MPT, 1997). In 1995,
more than fifty companies started to offer
Internet connection services on a commercial
basis. The number of host computers in Japan
directly connected to the global Internet was
doubling every 12 months, showing the same
rapid growth patterns as elsewhere in the
world (Aizu, 1995). In August 1995, the
Internet Society announced the latest results
of its regular host count survey. The number
of host computers connected to the Internet
in Japan was close to 150,000. In two years,
Japan had experienced a growth rate of 420%
(Aizu, 1995). In 2002, the number of Internet
users in Japan stood at 57.2 million (ITU,
2004) or about 45% of population. This
represents a growth of 141.55% from 1998
to 2002 (Kiko-Net, 2004). More recently, the
number of Internet users in Japan has reached
77 million people (Otake, 2004).
The political implications of Internet
usage began with the protest movement over
the presence of US bases in Okinawa
(Rimmer and Morris-Suzuki, 1999). The
Internet played an important part of the
campaign to reduce the US military presence
in the Okinawa prefecture. The local
government conducted an electronic
referendum, which allowed people from all
over Japan and the world to express their
views on the subject via the Internet. Though
there was no legal force to remove US bases
from Okinawan prefecture, the Internet
provided an innovative way of encouraging
outside interest in the Okinawa issue
(Okinawa Prefecture, 2004).
The second case involving the political impact
of the Internet concerned the indigenous Ainu
people of northern Japan. The issues were the
demand for a new Ainu law to replace the
repressive 19th-century “protection”
legislation which was still on the statute book;
and the protest movement against the Nibutani
Dam in Southern Hokkaido (Rimmer and
Morris-Suzuki, 1999). Supporters of the Ainu
protest movement used the Internet as a means
of disseminating information about the
progress of the courts case. At the beginning
of 1997, the Internet was also used to gather
over 700 signatures on a petition against the
Nibutani Dam, which was submitted to Prime
Minister Hashimoto (Rimmer and Morris-
Suzuki, 1999). As a result of this effort, in
1997, the government replaced the old
protection legislation with the Ainu Cultural
Promotion Law (FPCJ, 1997), which provides
a measure of government support for the
maintenance of the Ainu language and culture.
The court also ruled that the Ministry of
Construction had failed to recognize the
legitimate cultural rights of the Ainu people
as indigenous inhabitants of the Nibutani
region. Unfortunately, the dam was complete
and the order for the destruction of the dam
or the return of the land failed. In this case
the Internet became a network for grass-roots
political action with certain limitations
(Rimmer and Morris-Suzuki, 1999)
At the same time, political parties in
Japan exploited the Internet as a new means
of communication. Prior to the July 1995
Upper House election approximately 40
Japanese politicians constructed campaign
websites, a relative high number compared
with other countries holding elections around
this time (Davis, 1999). The first website for
a political party that went online was that of
the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) in June
1995, with other parties following shortly
thereafter. The parties focused on press
releases, party platforms and lists of
candidates, and constituencies (Tkach-
Kawasaki, 2003).
However, the Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs and Posts and
Communications threatened to make the sites
illegal under the media provisions of the
Public Offices Elections Law (POEL) (Mori,
2004). Personal and party political Web Pages,
it was suggested, contained “text and images”
that constituted political advertising and were
viewable by an “unspecified number of
people” during an official campaign activities
period (Otake, 2004). The ministry warned
of potential infringements of Section 142 of
the POEL. As a result, a number of candidates
voluntarily removed their websites, and
parties refrained from updating certain
portions of their sites during the official
campaign activities period or removed their
lists of candidates and constituencies (Tkach-
Kawasaki, 2003).
Shortly before the next general
election in October 1996, the issue of political
websites was addressed by the opposition
parties. In early October 1996, the now-
defunct New Party Sakigake submitted an
inquiry to the government asking for
clarification regarding the use of websites
during election campaigns. In the inquiry, the
party noted that the use of websites actually
upheld the original intent of Section 142 by
providing an inexpensive means of political
communication with the electorate; the party
also pointed out that the information in such
websites could benefit Japanese voters
residing overseas (Tkach-Kawasaki, 2003).
However, the Ministry insisted that
controlling the number of campaign
documents a candidate releases—and banning
distribution of video clips or e-mails once the
campaign period kicks off—would ensure
equal opportunity for all candidates,
regardless of their financial resources (Otake,
2004).  The Ministry also indicated that any
updates made by political parties or candidates
to their websites during the official campaign
activities period would be regarded as
infringing on the POEL (Tkach-Kawasaki,
2003).
Since 1996, a number of formal and
informal initiatives have been taken by
opposition parties regarding the “appropriate”
political use of the Internet. In the spring of
1997, the DPJ convened a study group
composed of nine young representatives from
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
Shinshinto, and Democratic Party of Japan
(DJP) parties to discuss how the Internet could
be used for political activities that included
providing information for Japanese voters
residing overseas and determining the
appropriate candidate information that should
be posted on websites (Tkach-Kawasaki,
2003). These efforts culminated in submission
of a proposed amendment by the DPJ to the
Lower House on 16 June 1998, a month prior
to the 1998 Upper House election, to reform
the POEL and allow websites to be used for
election campaign activites. The proposal,
however, was not acted upon (Tkach-
Kawasaki, 2003).
Though the issue of campaign website
has remained uncertainty and the government
has also continued to threaten legal action for
updating websites during election periods, the
incentives for both government and
opposition parties to use the Web have been
increasing. During 2000-2001, the political
parties and politicians took advantage of
uncertainty situation to incorporate the
Internet into their campaign communication
strategies. In February 2000, the DPJ leader
Hatoyama Yukio promoted the use of the
Internet in a magazine interview, noting that
websites and email could engage the
electorate in direct dialogue with politicians
(Netbrain at Tkach-Kawasaki, 2003). Late in
March 2000, former LDP Prime Minister
Mori personally urged LDP politicians and
candidates to establish websites in preparation
for the upcoming Lower House election.
In November 2000 the LDP faction leader
Kato Koichi, spurred on by support received
through his website, attempted to unseat
former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro as party
leader. Although the attempt failed, Koichi’s
experience prompted the LDP to see that the
Internet was more than simply another tool
for election campaigning (Tkach-Kawasaki,
2003). Hiroshi Miura and Yuji Tamura said
in The Japanese Times Online that in future
elections, with the power of Internet, younger
generations will begin to incorporate the use
of the Internet in their daily activities
especially considering the already existing
strong mobile phone culture. They will start
using it to check for real-time information on
candidates and last-minute changes to their
campaign schedules. It will make lawmakers
realize the power of the Internet and try to
use it more strategically (Otake, 2004).
In the spring of 2001, Prime Minister
Koizumi made extensive use of his website
to build support within the LDP, and went on
to win the party’s internal leadership race.
Flushed by this success, in late May 2001 the
Prime Minister started distributing a weekly
email newsletter through the official Prime
Minister’s Office website that quickly proved
highly popular, garnering a subscription base
of two million within two months of its
inception (Tkach-Kawasaki, 2003).
Rohsamo and Internet President in Korea
South Korea has established a world-
class information and communication
infrastructure in a joint effort between
government and private sector. At the end of
2003, 11.18 million households—more than
73% of the total number of households—
subscribed to broadband Internet and 29.22
million people—66% of the total
population—had access to the Internet (Chin,
2004).
South Korea is an example of a
country where Internet technology is being put
to the uses that experts once predicted so
optimistically for the world. South Korea is
also an exemplary country to see the impact
of Internet on politics because her unique
features in both technology and politics. First,
with the help of aggressive government
information telecommunication policies,
Korea has become technologically the most
advanced country in Internet usage. Korea is
the leading country in the world in the use of
broadband access to the Internet. Second,
South Korea is a relatively young democracy.
After three decades of military dictatorship,
it was only 10 years ago that Koreans had their
first civilian President by a democratic
election. Perhaps for this reason the impact
that the media has on political processes may
be greater and more clearly demonstrable in
a democratically young country such as Korea
(Kim, Moon, and Yang, 2004).
A result of the unique combination of the
country is characteristics as a young
democracy and the explicit government policy
regarding broadband Internet access, the
Internet played a critical role in the Korean
Presidential Election of 2002. The supporters
of Roh Moo-hyun and in particular members
of the “Rohsamo”—an acronym for “Roh
Moo-hyun Lovers Group” leveraged the
many-to-many communication capabilities of
the Internet to disseminate and critically
discuss political information. The Internet and
widespread broadband penetration made it
possible for a large number of voters to seek
alternative view and political information
unfiltered by the mass media. As a result, Roh
Moo-hyun became president against all odds,
and became known in the popular press as
the first “Internet President” (Watts, 2003).
At first, the Rohsamo did not set out to make
Roh Moo-hyun president of South Korea. It
was simply a fan club for people disillusioned
with the political process in Korea. People
joined the club because they identified with
Roh Moo-hyun’s new political vision for a
participatory democracy beyond regional
divisions that left a rift in South Korea politics
(Kim, Moon, and Yang, 2004). Rohsamo’s
goals shifted as the membership changed
throughout the two years leading up to the
presidential election. During March of 2002,
over 1.000 new members registered on the
Rohsamo site each day. Membership
increased dramatically from just 5,000 to
83,088 registered members distributed
worldwide in over 35 countries on five
continents, forming a transnational advocacy
network (Kim, Moon, and Yang, 2004). While
Rohsamo is an online community with
members distributed worldwide, local
Rohsamo meetings were held frequently.
From the beginning, members of Rohsamo
met face-to-face in addition to exchanging
political information and opinions online.
Regional groups set up their own forums in
online spaces in order to coordinate local
activities that were not of immediate
relevance to the entire community.
Rohsamo played a key role in critical
moments throughout Roh Moo-hyun’s road
to presidency. Members wrote and sent
handwritten letters supporting Roh and
coordinated campaign fundraising activities
both online and offline when internal friction
within Roh’s party threatened the financial
viability of his continued candidacy,
managing to raise approximately $700,000 in
seven days (Kim, Moon, and Young, 2004).
Overseas members who could not vote
themselves produced pamphlets of evocative
and emotionally stirring personal testimonials
supporting Roh Moo-hyun. Members
coordinated to disseminate these pamphlets
to travelers en route to Seoul in airport
throughout Europe in order to persuade
potential undecided voters to vote for Roh.
When real time polls on the day of the election
indicated that he was trailing candidate Lee
Hoi-chang, Rohsamo members sent text
messages to mobilize the Roh supporters to
vote (Kim, Moon, and Yang, 2004).
Figure 1. Candidate support by time of day
(Source: KBS Media Research Exit Polls,
adapted from Kim, Moon and Yang, 2004)
Discussion
Through these four case studies, we
may see that the Internet plays an important
role in politics. In East Asia, China, Japan,
and Korea were each unique in the ways that
Internet played a key role in politics. We may
see that the percentage of Internet penetration
and the number of Internet users increased
significantly. While in South East Asia,
Although Indonesia has a far lower percentage
of Internet penetration and number of Internet
users compared with China, Japan, and Korea,
there are some similarities in how the Internet
was influenced politics either in government
or at the civil society level.
In comparing China and Indonesia,
both states have maintained that the Internet
should be controlled by the government. We
can see that although both did undergo
privatization in their telecommunication
industries, the Internet remained as a part of
government’s political vehicle (de Kleot,
1999). The Chinese government does make
many efforts things to control the Internet. For
instance, censorship with its “Great Fire Wall”
(Fackler, 2002); it has forced Internet cafes
to close down; it has banned more than 100
sites that promote democracy (Amnesty,
2002); and has arrested cyber-activists (Chou,
2004). All of these solutions were known as
low tech solution for high tech problem and
high tech solution for high tech problem
(Chase & Mulvenon, 2002). In Indonesia, the
government tries to control the Internet by
increasing the cost of telephone taxes. This
will directly affect Internet connection fee
because most Internet connections use the
dial-up system (Chip-Online, 2005). The
government also owns the two
telecommunication companies, Telecom and
Indosat, which have a license to provide
Internet access for global world (Idris, 2000).
In both countries, China and Indonesia, the
Internet plays a crucial role for the
transnational social/religious movement in a
globalized network society. In China it has
bee used for the promotion of the Falungong,
a quasi-religious sect led by Chinese guru Li
Hongzhi based in the U.S. (Androff Jr., 2001)
that was finally banned by Chinese
government (Hepinstall, 2001). While in
Indonesia, the fall of Suharto’s New Order
regime was said to be backed up by an-email
list providing the intellectual elite of Indonesia
with the right ammunition to counter the
propaganda machine of Suharto. That list,
titled the Apakabar list, was moderated by an
American from Maryland in the U.S. Authors
claimed that the list, which uses Bahasa
Indonesia as the main language, played a
crucial role in the fall of the regime (Harsono,
2001).
Transnational cyberpolitics also
played a role in Japan. The protest movements
concerning the Okinawan Prefecture and Ainu
are good examples, in which civil society uses
the Internet to give strength to their
movements. Without support from the Internet
to inform supporters around the world, these
cases might not have gotten as much high
attention. Moreover, civil society in Indonesia
has developed their “guerilla movement” with
utilizing Japanese satellite and cooperating
with a global actor (Japan Corporation
Satellite and WIDE Japan) which had a global
project (the Asian Internet Initiative Project)
to create a mass base for the Internet (Lim,
2003). It gave an opportunity to civil society
to circumvent rules imposed by the
Indonesian government.
In addition, political parties in both
Japan and Indonesia demonstrate similarity
in Internet usage to open up new
opportunities. In Japan, small political parties
use the Internet to attract potential voters. The
Internet has had significant impact on the
fortunes of minor parties, opening up cross-
party competition and enhancing their calls
for legislative reform (Tkach-Kawasaki,
2003). Similarly, in Indonesia, the Internet
became a new space for political parties to
express their opinions, and build dynamic
alliances and a broad national coalition (Hill,
2003). In this point, the political parties in
Japan and Indonesia found an alternative
media to save time and money to attract their
potential voters. The Internet is clearly
opening up new channels for smaller parties,
candidates, interest groups, and politically
aware individuals to reach the public.
South Korea, as a country that does
not have strict regulation about Internet, the
cooperation between government and Private
Company has opened new ways of Internet
to be a key role in president election. For the
future, the Internet will be used as an
electronic election like what the United States
did for president’s election in 2004. The
Internet has empowered the individual to have
a greater level of participation in the political
process, if that person is already pre-disposed
to be active in civic life. The support of youth
generation who is familiar with the Internet
early will be a great potential influence for
politics culture. In this case Indonesia can
learn much from South Korea to use the
Internet to build positive image. The Internet
will be seen as a new and alternative mean of
communication because the huge emerging
of Internet café in Indonesia.
Conclusion
Each countries, China, Indonesia,
Japan, and Korea, has its own unique to use
the Internet in their political system. In
government level, the Internet becomes a part
to establish and maintain the power. Some
countries such as China, Indonesia try to
control the Internet, while Japan and Korea
take benefits from the high penetration of
Internet in their society to disseminate
information about the power. Meanwhile in
civil society level, the Internet becomes a
means to distribute the information about their
movement. It also becomes a tool to show the
existence of civil society. Therefore, the
Internet could be believed that it might play
an important role to create new type of
government and society.
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